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INTEREST ARBITRATION: A NEW TERMINAL IMPASSE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURE FOR ILLINOIS PUBLIC
SECTOR EMPLOYEES
A practical analysis of the impasse procedures of the new Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act by practitioners experienced in
collective bargaining and impasse resolution.
RICHARD W. LANER*AND JULIA W. MANNING**
In 1983, the Illinois legislature enacted, effective July 1, 1984, the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, a comprehensive statute to govern
labor relations for a significant number of public employees within the
State.I The Act provides that certain essential state and municipal em-
ployees who are denied the right to strike must resolve negotiating im-
passes through a procedure which has as its terminal step compulsory
interest arbitration.2 Although all other public sector employees have
been granted the right to strike and are excluded from these impasse
resolution provisions, it is quite possible that a number of public em-
ployers and unions voluntarily will resort to interest arbitration to re-
solve their impasses as a practical alternative to employee strikes.3 The
* Mr. Laner, a partner with the Chicago law firm of Dorfman, Cohen, Laner and Muchin,
Ltd., participated in the drafting of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act as labor relations
counsel for the City of Chicago. He and his firm also represented the City of Chicago in interest
arbitrations with the Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7, and the Chicago Firefight-
ers Union, Local No. 2.
** Ms. Manning is associated with the law firm of Dorfman, Cohen, Laner and Muchin,
Ltd. B.A., 1978, Duke University; J.D., 1982, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 1601 et. seq. (1983). The Act covers the majority of state and
municipal employees within the State. Educational employees are not covered; a new Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act, also enacted in 1983, governs these employees. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 1701 et seq. (1983). Additionally, municipal police and firefighters are excluded from
coverage under the Act. They were originally included in the Act, but opted out when the drafters
provided that all interest arbitration awards be subject to legislative ratification, a concept which
police and firefighter unions rejected. A separate collective bargaining act to cover police and fire
employees was proposed in 1984, but failed to pass. Employer groups successfully lobbied against
the proposed bill because it provided for compulsory interest arbitration without legislative ap-
proval, the same issue which resulted in the unions' rejection of the 1983 Act.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(g); see also 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1230, Final rules of the
Illinois State and Local Labor Relations Boards concerning impasse resolution. These rules, with
minor amendments, mirror the Emergency Rules issued by the Boards in September, 1984. 8 ILL.
REG. 17322 (Sept. 11, 1984). The Rules became final on January 25, 1985.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1617. Illinois has become one of ten states to provide a limited
right to strike to certain public employees. Illinois public employees, other than security employ-
ees, state peace officers and state firefighters, may strike if: (I) the employees are represented by
an exclusive bargaining representative; (2) the collective bargaining agreement, if any, has ex-
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parties may place in their collective bargaining agreements or other-
wise agree on a case-by-case basis to use interest arbitration as their
impasse resolution vehicle.
Thus, there is a need to examine the structural framework for
compulsory interest arbitration in light of theoretical constructs and
practical experiences from other states as to how the arbitration proce-
dure can affect the collective bargaining process. Further, there is a
need to develop practical guidelines to assist public employers and un-
ions in preparing for interest arbitration.
I. THE COMPULSORY IMPASSE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act provides for a compulsory
two-step impasse resolution procedure: first, mediation; then, a form of
compulsory interest arbitration which combines final offer and conven-
tional interest arbitration. 4 This procedure is applicable to collective
bargaining agreements involving units of security employees,5 state
peace officers, state firefighters, and all employees who, pursuant to
court order, have been ordered to return to work following a post-im-
passe strike.6
pired, or such agreement does not prohibit strikes; (3) the parties have not agreed to submit inter-
est disputes to final and binding arbitration; (4) the exclusive bargaining representative has
requested mediation; and (5) the exclusive representative has given the public employer five days
notice of its intent to strike. Id. at § 1617(a).
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that public sector strikes are inimical to government,
Illinois has granted its public employees the right to strike for pragmatic reasons. First, organized
labor would not accept legislation without this feature and various elected state officials had publi-
cally committed themselves to the bill. Second, the reality is that public employees strike regard-
less of whether or not such action is prohibited. The legislature, in recognition of this reality,
allowed a limited right to strike, but provided for some regulation of such action by permitting
courts to enjoin strikes presenting "a clear and present danger to the health and safety of the
public." Id. at § 1618. Third, the Illinois legislature presumably recognized that the right to strike
has not adversely affected the conduct of government. Public employers have become less willing
to avoid strikes at any cost. Public opinion increasingly supports this position in light of the
public's understanding of the personal, economic and tax consequences of granting increases to
public employees as labor costs are the largest share of government costs. See, e.g., Olson, Ad-
vances to Impasse Resolution: The Use of the Legal Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 33 LAB.
L.J. 494, 495 (1982); Summer, Public Employee Bargaining: 4 Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.
REV. 1156 (1974); Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box4 19 N.Y.L.F. 567, 571
(1974).
4. The Act provides that mediation shall commence 30 days prior to the expiration date of
any collective bargaining agreement involving a unit of covered employees. The compulsory in-
terest arbitration process commences if the dispute is not resolved prior to 14 days before expira-
tion of such agreement. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(a). See also 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE§§ 1230.40(b) and (e), 1230.60.
5. "Security employee" means an employee who is responsible for the supervision and con-
trol of inmates at correctional facilities, and would also include other non-security employees in
bargaining units having the majority of employees being responsible for the supervision and con-
trol of inmates at correctional facilities. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1603(o).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1618(a).
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A. The Merits of Issue-by-Issue Final Offer Arbitration Versus
Conventional Arbitration
The Act structures interest arbitration as a bifurcated process. As
to each economic issue, "the arbitration panel shall adopt the last offer
of settlement which in the opinion of the arbitration panel, more nearly
complies with the applicable factors prescribed in [the Act]."' 7 This is
the issue-by-issue method offinal offer arbitration. As to non-economic
items, the panel evaluates these issues in light of the statutory criteria
and then decides each issue as it deems appropriate. This method of
dispute resolution is conventional interest arbitration.
In reaching a final and binding arbitration award, the panel is re-
quired to call a hearing within 15 days of its selection. 8 At or before
the conclusion of the hearing the panel must "identify the economic
issues in dispute." 9 The parties then present their last offer of settle-
ment on each economic issue during the period prescribed by the
panel.' 0 Within 30 days after the conclusion of the hearing, I" the panel
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(g). Section 14(h) of the Act sets forth the eight factors
which the panel must utilize in evaluating each party's proposals. These eight factors are as
follows:
(1) The lawful authority of the employer.
(2) Stipulations of the parties.
(3) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the unit of
government to meet those costs.
(4) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the employ-
ees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions of em-
ployment of other employees performing similar services and with other employees
generally:
(A) In public employment in comparable communities.
(B) In private employment in comparable communities.
(5) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known as the
cost of living.
(6) The overall compensation presently received by the employees, including di-
rect wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other excused time, insurance and pen-
sions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and stability of employment
and all other benefits received.
(7) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the ar-
bitration proceedings.
(8) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or tradi-
tionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of
employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbitration
or otherwise between the parties, in the public service or in private employment.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(d).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(g); see also 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1230.40 (e)(6). Addi-
tionally, § 14(g) of the Act provides that "Itihe determination of the arbitration panel as to the
issues in dispute and as to which of these issues are economic shall be conclusive."
10. Id.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(g) allows the parties to mutually agree to extend the time
for the issuance of the award. But see 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1230.40(e)(9) which provides that:
Whenever one party has objected in good faith to the presence of an issue before the
arbitration panel on the ground that the issue does not involve a subject over which the
parties are required to bargain, the arbitration panel's award shall not consider that is-
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must make written findings of fact and promulgate a written opinion. 12
The arbitration award consists of the adopted final offers on each eco-
nomic issue in dispute and the panel's own resolution of non-economic
issues in dispute.
The structure of this hybrid form of final offer arbitration,
although not unique to Illinois,13 will have a significant impact on how
the parties and arbitrators approach bargaining and the arbitration
process. The drafters of this procedure selected a bifurcated structure
in the belief that it would more likely encourage voluntary settlement
and discourage the resort to arbitration.' 4 Specifically, for non-eco-
nomic items, parties typically are fearful of the imposition of contrac-
tual language by a neutral who may be unfamiliar with the intricacies
of the parties' relationship. Under the Illinois Act, therefore, parties
will have every incentive to resolve non-economic issues on their own
because if they do not reach agreement, the arbitration panel has the
discretion, pursuant to the conventional interest arbitration procedure,
to impose what it believes to be just and equitable language. On eco-
nomic issues, the issue-by-issue approach under the Illinois Act should
encourage the parties to make reasonable proposals and movement, as
failure to do so may result in the panel's rejection of a party's final
economic offer.' 5 The question that experience will answer is whether
the perceptions of how this bifurcated process should operate will hold
true.
A number of criticisms have been leveled against both conven-
tional and issue-by-issue final offer arbitration. The most serious com-
plaint against conventional arbitration is that it undermines any
effective negotiations prior to arbitration. In conventional arbitration,
the final award typically incorporates parts of both parties' proposals.
Such awards are viewed as a compromise split of the differences be-
tween the parties' positions. As a result, the parties postpone produc-
sue. However, the arbitration panel may consider and render an award on any issue that
has been declared pursuant to 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1200.140(b) [declaratory rulings
by the General Counsel] to be a subject over which the parties are required to bargain.
12. Id; see also 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1230.40(e)(7).
13. Michigan's Police and Firefighters Arbitration statute, MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 423.231 ei seq. (1978), similarly combines issue-by-issue final offer arbitration as to economic
issues with conventional arbitration as to non-economic issues.
14. The statutory language was adopted without discussion by the Illinois legislature. How-
ever, the legislators who were involved with union and employer representatives in the drafting
process were aware that this structure was the product of a significant amount of analysis and
forethought and was recommended by the City of Chicago's representatives with this in mind.
15. In drafting the arbitration procedures, a total package final offer arbitration process was
not seriously considered; the "all-or-nothing" nature of this form of arbitration was viewed as
unpalatable to both labor and management.
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tive negotiation if they believe that their dispute eventually will be
settled by an arbitrator. This encourages the parties to press extreme
demands on each other and the arbitrator with the hope that the arbi-
trator will award more than the other party would otherwise accept.' 6
This is the "chilling effect" of conventional arbitration on
negotiations. 17
The final offer arbitration procedure, introduced in the public sec-
tor in the 1960's,18 was designed expressly to meet this objection. The
basic objective of final offer arbitration is the advancement of collective
bargaining and voluntary agreement. The final offer approach seeks to
increase the cost to the parties of failing to reach agreement by elimi-
nating the arbitrator's ability to compromise issues, and substituting a
winner-take-all outcome. Proponents of final offer arbitration assume
that each party will advance proposals that are both reasonable and
representative of their actual bargaining position to ensure that its final
offer will be selected by the arbitrator. Stated differently, the parties
will narrow the differences between their proposals because of their
mutual fear that the other party's offer will be selected. Consequently,
it is assumed that final offer arbitration should not chill collective bar-
gaining; its high-risk winner-take-all outcome should assure its non-use
and force the parties closer together. In theory, this incentive to com-
promise and reach agreement is comparable to the pressure of a strike
deadline in the private sector.' 9
This theory of the effectiveness of final offer arbitration, however,
is most relevant to total package final offer arbitration, a truly all-or-
nothing process in which each party substitutes as a package its final
offer on each issue in dispute. Issue-by-issue final offer arbitration as
provided for in the Illinois Act for economic issues, on the other hand,
tends to have a chilling effect on productive negotiations comparable to
that of conventional arbitration. Issue-by-issue arbitration is a process
of compromise; the arbitrator is free to find for one party on some is-
sues and for the other party on others. In fact, a greater "chill" to pro-
ductive negotiations may result under the issue-by-issue procedure
because it tends to encourage each party to make demands on every
16. See, e.g., Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining, 5 INDUS. REL.
at 44-45 (Feb. 1966); Note, Final Offer Arbitration and the Labor-Management Posse. Heading Off
Municipal Disputes at the Impasse, 59 B.U. L. REV. 105, 110 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Final
Offer .
17. See, e.g., Nelson, Final Offer Arbitration.- Some Problems, 30 A"a. J. 50, 53 (1975).
18. Carl Stevens in 1966 was one of the first to recommend final offer arbitration. See supra
note 16.
19. Weitzman and Stochaj, Attitudes of Arbitrators Toward Final-Offer Arbitration in New
Jersey, 35 ARB. J. 25, 27 (Mar. 1980).
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front, knowing there is nothing to lose,20 and always a chance to gain a
bit here and there. The incentives against narrowing the issues in dis-
pute encourage parties to leave political and low priority demands on
the table.2' Whatever the nature of the remaining demands, the clear
result is that time and money may be wasted and the process cluttered
unnecessarily. Also, under issue-by-issue arbitration the resolution of
one issue at a time may result in the arbitrator losing sight of the very
practical reality that contract proposals are frequently interdependent
and must be decided together.22
Yet the issue-by-issue process is not without proponents. Arbitra-
tors consistently favor arbitration procedures which permit them to ex-
ercise discretion and, hence, in their view, allow them to arrive at an
equitable result. When an arbitrator is confronted with a multi-issue
dispute, the issue-by-issue process permits the arbitrator to reject cer-
tain demands which otherwise would have been included in an award
under a total package final offer procedure, assuming that the overall
package would otherwise have been reasonable. 23 Additionally, the is-
sue-by-issue process puts a premium on the reasonableness of final of-
fers because of the parties' fear of rejection of their offer by the panel.
Again, however, the parties still have no incentive to drop less impor-
tant proposals.
Public employers tend to favor the issue-by-issue approach in
those collective bargaining situations in which the employer is demand-
ing that the union give up certain contractual rights or benefits. Under
this approach, the employer has more chance of convincing the arbitra-
tor than the union that some, if not all, of such "take backs" are war-
ranted; under a total package final offer procedure employers feel they
are less likely to prevail with the same position on an all-or-nothing
basis. Finally, because a number of jurisdictions have adopted the is-
sue-by-issue process, 24 and the two jurisdictions that have most recently
20. Nelson, supra note 17, at 56.
21. Phillips, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Bargaining. The Need to Reevalu-
ate Options, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 547, 567 (1978-79); Zack, supra note 3, at 579.
22. Phillips, supra note 21, at 567; Zack, supra note 3, at 579. ("For example, whether certain
fringe benefits should be granted, or more para-professional aides hired, depends on the total
amount of money allocated to the entire package.") Cf., Nelson, supra note 17, at 56.
23. Cf., Nelson, supra note 17, at 55-56.
24. Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Title 7, ch. 113, § 7-467 et seq. (1984) (municipal
employees) and Title 10 ch. 166, § 10-153g (1984) (teachers)); Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 1614(g) (1983)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20, 20.1 etseq. (1978) (all public employees)); Michi-
gan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.271 et seq. (1984) (state police) and § 423.231 et seq. (1978)
(municipal police and fire for economic issues only)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 33, § 179
61 et seq. (1984) (mandatory for essential employees; voluntary for other employees)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. Title 39, ch. 31, Parts 1-4 (1983) (voluntary for fire only)); New Jersey (N.J.
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approved public sector collective bargaining, Illinois and Ohio, have
incorporated this procedure into their impasse resolution process, the
approach evidently has proven to be a politically viable impasse resolu-
tion vehicle.
B. Other Features of the Compulsory Impasse Resolution Procedure
There are certain other features of the arbitration procedure in the
Illinois Act which may affect the collective bargaining process and/or
the conduct of the arbitration hearing and its outcome.
1. Mediation
First, mediation is a prerequisite to the compulsory interest arbi-
tration proceeding for security employees and state peace officers and
state firefighters.25 Mediation must commence at least 30 days prior to
the expiration of collective bargaining agreements involving units of
these employees. 26 If the dispute is not resolved prior to 14 days before
contract expiration, one of the parties must submit a request for arbi-
tration.2 7 The Illinois Act empowers the Board28 to establish a Public
Employees Mediation Roster from which the Board will select a medi-
ator when a request for mediation is received. 29 The Act provides that
"[tihe function of the mediator shall be to communicate with the em-
ployer and exclusive representative or their representatives and to en-
STAT. ANN. ch. 85, § 34:13A-14 et seq. (1984) (police and fire: package for economic issues and
issue-by-issue for non-economic issues)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(D)(1)(1983) (man-
datory for "safety" employees)).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(a); see also 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1230.60.
26. Id.
27. Id
28. The Act creates two Boards. The Illinois State Labor Relations Board ("State Board")
has jurisdiction over collective bargaining matters between employee organizations and the State
of Illinois, between employee organizations and units of local government with a population not
in excess of one million, and between employee organizations and the Regional Transportation
Authority. The Illinois Local Labor Relations Board ("Local Board") has jurisdiction over collec-
tive bargaining matters between employee organizations and units of local government with a
population in excess of one million. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1605(a) and (b); see also 80 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 1230.60(b) which provides that whenever the Board invokes mediation it will first
supply the parties with a panel of at least three names of mediators from the Roster. The parties
have seven days to choose a mediator on the panel or any other person to serve as mediator. At
the end of this seven day period, if the parties have not notified the Board of their selection, a
mediator will be selected by the Board from the Roster.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1612(b); see also 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1230.60(b) which pro-
vides that whenever the Board invokes mediation it will first supply the parties with a panel of at
least three names of mediators from the Roster. The parties have seven days to choose a mediator
or the panel or any other person to serve as mediator. At the end of this seven day period, if the
parties have not notified the Board of their selection, a mediator will be selected by the Board
from the Roster.
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deavor to bring about an amicable and voluntary settlement."' 30 To
facilitate the mediation process, the Board's Rules on impasse resolu-
tion provide for the confidentiality of communications with the media-
tor, and for the confidentiality of the mediator's work product. 3'
The effectiveness of mediation depends upon a variety of factors.
A skilled mediator can help to bring about settlement by narrowing
issues, suggesting alternatives, opening up communications between
the parties, and adding to the credibility of one of the parties by con-
firming the truth of the proponent's position. The insight of an impar-
tial third party can help to find creative solutions in difficult situations.
Thus, a mediator's value is the greatest with inexperienced bargainers
and/or with groups of employees who have unrealistic expectations.
However, when the parties use mediation as just a required preliminary
step to arbitration, there is little true incentive to settle. Of course, even
in these situations, a mediator can help to narrow the issues in dispute.
2. Voluntary Fact-Finding
The Illinois Act provides for non-binding fact-finding, 32 but not as
a compulsory pre-arbitration step. In fact-finding hearings, as in arbi-
tration, evidence is presented to a neutral third party. The parties may
select a fact-finder from the Public Employees Mediation Roster estab-
lished by the Board. The fact-finder evaluates the evidence and issues
a written recommendation as to the most equitable resolution of the
issues in dispute. The parties may decide to adopt the fact-finder's rec-
ommendations or they may utilize his or her findings as the basis for
further negotiation. 33
The drafters of the Illinois Act did not make fact-finding
mandatory because they did not believe it to be an effective part of the
overall impasse resolution procedure. Recent experience of other states
raises questions about the value of fact-finding. A number ofjurisdic-
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1612(a).
31. 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1230.60(e) and (f) which provide as follows:
(e) The mediator may hold joint and separate conferences with the parties. The
conference shall be private unless the mediator and the parties agree otherwise;
(f) Information disclosed by a party to a mediator in the performance of mediation
functions shall not be disclosed voluntarily or by compulsion. All files, records, reports,
documents, or other papers prepared by a mediator shall be considered confidential.
The mediator shall not produce any confidential records of, or testify in regard to, any
mediation conducted by him, on behalf of any party to any cause pending in any type of
proceeding.
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1613.
33. Zack, supra note 3, at 569. The Board's rules on fact-finding, 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 1230.70(d), provide that "[tihe Board shall make the [fact-finder's] report available to newspa-
pers upon request." Such publication could put significant pressure on the parties to settle.
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tions have experimented with the use of non-binding fact-finding as a
mandatory step prior to final offer arbitration. 34 In many of these juris-
dictions the fact-finder's report or recommendation serves as one op-
tion, in addition to the parties' proposals, that the arbitrator could
select in total package final offer arbitration.35 The experience in these
jurisdictions suggests that fact-finding was an unproductive step and
inimical to the policies underlying final offer arbitration.36 Fact-find-
ing in such settings has proved unsuccessful for two reasons. First,
fact-finding places no pressure on the parties to resolve issues. In fact,
the issue-by-issue resolution of impasse items allows a party to submit
any number of items, many of which may be unreasonable or throw-
aways, without jeopardizing its other proposals.37 Second, such fact-
finding has not led to productive renegotiation so as to avoid arbitra-
tion. Instead, the fact-finder has come to resemble a master for the
arbitrator as opposed to a facilitator. The arbitration, in turn, has be-
come a show cause hearing with the sole issue being why the fact-
finder's recommendations should not be adopted.38
Voluntary fact-finding was provided under the Act primarily as an
aid to parties inexperienced in collective bargaining; that is, the Act
alerts parties to both the existence and availability of this additional
procedure for the resolution of interest disputes. It is unlikely that ex-
perienced negotiators will utilize fact-finding because the process typi-
cally fails to narrow the issues in dispute, is duplicative of arbitration
which may be mandated by statute or contract, and is unnecessarily
costly and time-consuming.
3. Tripartite Arbitration Panel
The Act's mandated tripartite arbitration panel includes a neutral
member who serves as chairman, and one partisan delegate for each of
34. See, e.g., Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. § 20.21 (1978)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 965(3) (1983)); Massachusetts (MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § I et seq. (1982)); New York
(N.Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 200 et seq. (1983)).
35. Id.
36. Phillips, supra note 21, at 554, and citations therein at footnote 48; Rehmus, Varieties of
Final Offer Arbitration, 37 ARB. J. 4, 6 (Dec. 1982).
37. Id. Additionally, when issue-by-issue final offer arbitration is the next step, a party is
encouraged to adhere to its unreasonable proposals, assuming the fact-finder's proposal is rela-
tively unobjectionable, because the party's chances are two-out-of-three for a favorable award.
38. Note, Final Offer, supra note 16, at 113-14. State studies, in fact, indicate that: (1) arbi-
trators treat the arbitration hearing as one where the burden of persuasion is on the party seeking
to overturn the fact-finder's report; and (2) arbitrators tend to undertake little independent analy-
sis. Phillips, supra note 21, at 562; Gallagher, Interest Arbitration Under the Iowa Public Employ-
ment Relations Act, 33 ARa. J. 30, 34 (1978); Anderson, MacDonald and O'Reilly, Impasse
Resolution in Public Sector Collective Bargaining-An Examination of Compulsory Interest Arbitra-
tion in New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 453, 464 (1977).
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the parties. 39 A number of other jurisdictions have similar tripartite
panels composed of one neutral and two partisans.40 The experience in
those jurisdictions is that the presence of the two partisan arbitrators
conveniently permits the neutral arbitrator's role to become that of a
mediator.4' On the other hand, the existence of partisans on the panel
may simply result in the reargument of the case by the partisans to the
neutral and hence, merely delay the issuance of the award.42 The po-
tential positive effects of a tripartite panel, however, outweigh the pos-
sibility of undue delay. The panel can facilitate negotiations between
parties with little bargaining experience. Our experience confirms that
of other commentators which indicates that the partisan panel mem-
bers facilitate the flow of communication between the parties and be-
tween the parties and the neutral chairman. In fact, numerous disputes
have been settled by the parties during arbitration after feedback from
the chairman on the parties' respective positions.43 The tripartite panel
structure allows for necessary informal communication with the chair-
man, facilitates on-going negotiations and often encourages settlement
prior to a final award.
In light of the important role of the neutral chairman, he or she
should not only be experienced in labor relations and arbitration, but
where possible, should also demonstrate some knowledge and under-
standing of municipal planning, budget preparation, municipal tax
structures and related fiscal matters.44 The Act provides that unless the
parties have agreed upon an arbitrator or have agreed to use an alter-
nate source of interest arbitrators, the Board will select seven names
from the Public Employee Labor Mediation Roster to serve as nomi-
nees. The parties strike names to arrive at the designee.45 The parties
thus will have an opportunity to review, before their choice is made,
the experience, qualifications, labor or management leanings, past arbi-
tration awards, and availability of the nominees.
The selection of a partisan panel member requires the use of dif-
ferent criteria. The most important attributes of a partisan arbitrator
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1614(b) and (c).
40. A survey of the types of arbitration panels adopted in various states between 1950 and
1974 indicates that 20.3% had a tripartite panel like the one provided for in the Illinois Act; 63%
had a single neutral arbitrator; and 8% had three neutral arbitrators. See, 17 LAB. L.J. 297 (1977)
(Sources: LAB. ARB. (BNA) (1950-74) and LAB. ARB. AWARDS, (CCH) (1960-74)).
41. See, e.g., Newman, Interest Arbitration: Impressions of a PERB Chairman, 37 ARB. J. 7, 8
(Dec. 1982).
42. Zack, supra note 3, at 582.
43. Nelson, supra note 17, at 54-55.
44. Note, Final Offer Arbitration in Massachusetts, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 693, 708 (1977).
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 §§ 1614 (b) and (c); 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1230.40(e)(i)-(3).
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are familarity with the operation of and intricacies of employment in
the governmental unit, and the ability to advocate the party's position
in executive sessions to assure that the chairman has a clear under-
standing of the party's interests and priorities.46 Typically, this dictates
that each party's chief negotiator will serve as a partisan member of the
arbitration panel. The chief negotiator's presence is particularly criti-
cal if the neutral is also to be used as a mediator. The partisan repre-
sentative must know the guidelines of the party's position and strategy
and should be given the authority to make commitments in executive
sessions within these guidelines without the need to seek additional ap-
proval.47 In sum, if the partisan is not the chief negotiator he or she
must be given the authority traditionally accorded such a negotiator in
collective bargaining.
4. Mediation-Arbitration-"Med-Arb"
The Illinois Act provides that the neutral chairman of the panel
may remand the dispute to the parties for further collective bargaining
for a period not to exceed two weeks at any time prior to rendering an
award, if this would be useful or beneficial. 48 By exercising this option
the chairman may be assuming the role of mediator. Thus, in addition
to the discretion lodged in the panel because of the issue-by-issue final
offer process for economic issues and the conventional arbitration pro-
cess for non-economic issues, the chairman's "med-arb" role provides
the chairman with enormous leverage over the parties. Originally, the
term "med-arb" was used to describe an impasse resolution process in
which the parties select a mediator with the understanding that any
issue that cannot be resolved in mediation will finally be arbitrated by
that same individual. Such a procedure is used in New Jersey. Today,
"med-arb" has a broader meaning and refers to all situations in which
one individual fills the role of mediator and arbitrator.
The "med-arb" process tends to encourage settlement prior to the
issuance of awards because if the parties do not settle their differences,
they are, for all practical purposes, forced to go along with the neutral's
recommendation because a failure to do so will ordinarily result in an
order to do so. Parties, however, may choose to have a settlement im-
posed upon them, as opposed to reaching their own settlement, if, for
46. The authors' experience with the role of the partisan arbitrator is supported in Bowers,
Practical Guide to the Arbitration Process, 61 GoV'T EMPL REL. REP., Ref. File 104, (BNA, 1975)
at 401-02.
47. Id.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(f).
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example, the result contains politically unpopular compromises. The
"med-arb" process can be effective because first, it encourages the par-
ties to settle in arbitration and second, the "parties participate in the
outcome, challenging the arbitrator to justify and explain settlements
suggested or compromises proposed. '49 The partisans, in informally
communicating with the arbitrator, can clarify their party's priorities
and point out which issues are politically sensitive.
The "med-arb" process is not without pitfalls or short-comings.
The partisan arbitration panel members, at worst, can lose their case in
mediation with the chairman, and at best, may have to be very circum-
spect in communicating with the chairman. An honest softening of one
position, as part of an overall offer to settle, may "prejudice" the neu-
tral to mistakenly assume that adoption of this softened position may
be acceptable to the offering party when, in fact, a better result could
have been attained if no such offer had been made in mediation. For
example, if a party's negotiation final offer is a 2% wage increase, the
partisan in arbitration may be able to justify this position. If the parti-
san, on the other hand, in mediation with the chairman serving as me-
diator, were to suggest that his or her party may be willing to move to
4%, not only is the chairman likely to reject that party's 2% "final of-
fer", but the party and its partisan may lose all credibility on other
issues with the chairman. Finally, the settlements reached through the
"med-arb" process are arguably coerced and artificial in the sense that
they may not necessarily represent the settlement the parties themselves
might have reached through bargaining.
5. Timing of the Final Offer
The Illinois Act provides that at or before the conclusion of the
hearing and after the panel has identified the economic issues in dis-
pute, the parties are to present their final offers on each economic is-
sue.50 The timing of the final offer may have a significant impact on
how the arbitration proceeds. The timing established in the Illinois Act
allows the parties to adjust their positions in light of the recommenda-
tions of the neutral chairman, in his or her mediator role, thereby al-
lowing each party to increase its chances that the panel will select its
final offer. Some have suggested that the final offer should come at the
commencement of the arbitration hearing because that gives "the par-
ties the opportunity to develop fully the preferability of their proposal
49. Rehmus, supra note 36, at 6.
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(g).
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over their opponent's" and gives the arbitrator "the opportunity to
question both parties on their respective positions."'S This position is
typically advanced by those who favor building into the process the
maximum number of incentives for settlement by adding uncertainty
and risks to the arbitration process so as to discourage its use. 52 The
procedure in the Illinois Act, in this respect, by contrast, tends to tip the
scale away from encouraging settlement in the negotiations process and
instead, appears to give the parties greater flexibility to use the process
to their best advantage in arbitration.
6. Legislative Approval
Finally, one of the Act's most significant provisions requires legis-
lative approval of all collective bargaining provisions which in whole
or in part are the result of compulsory interest arbitration orders. Such
agreements must "be submitted to the public employer's governing
body for ratification and adoption by.law, ordinance, or the equivalent
appropriate means. ' 53 If the governing body neither accepts nor rejects
the arbitration panel's decision within 20 days of issuance, the term or
terms of the panel's decision will automatically become part of the par-
ties' collective bargaining agreement. 54 If the governing body rejects
the panel's decision, the governing body must explain such rejection,
and thereafter, the parties are remanded to arbitration for supplemen-
tal proceedings and issuance of a supplemental decision with respect to
the rejected terms.55 Then, the parties must again seek legislative ap-
proval of the resulting award. 56 The employer must assume the total
cost of all supplemental proceedings, including the reasonable attor-
ney's fees of the union.57
When the Act originally passed the Illinois Senate it did not pro-
vide for the right of the governing body to reject all or part of a com-
pulsory interest arbitration award. The City of Chicago and other
Illinois public employers vigorously opposed the concept that the deci-
sion of a third party in a statutorily mandated dispute resolution pro-
cess should be binding upon a political subdivision without the
51. Zack, supra note 3, at 581.
52. In Wisconsin, the final offer must be presented prior to the arbitration hearing and cannot
be changed thereafter. (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (1984)). Commentators suggest this may well
encourage settlement. See, e.g., Rehrnus, supra note 36.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(m); 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1230.40(e)(10) and (!1).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(n); 80 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 1230.40(e)(10).
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approval of the legislative body. When the bill reached the House, ne-
gotiations between the City of Chicago's representatives, organized la-
bor and the House and Senate leadership eventually resulted, among
other things, in the provision which currently is in the Act, giving the
governing legislative body the right to reject compulsory interest arbi-
tration awards.
From the public employer's standpoint, this provision is essential.
A third party should not be able to impose upon a political subdivision,
without the legislature's approval, an economic settlement which is fis-
cally irresponsible or would require a substantial reallocation of the
political subdivision's resources. As a practical matter, if a legislative
body were not empowered to reject such an award, it could refuse to
appropriate the necessary monies to fund the award. Costly and time-
consuming litigation would ensue and the resulting strain on communi-
cation between the parties to the arbitration would make effective labor
relations impossible.
C. The Anticioated Effects of the Compulsory Interest Arbitration
Procedure
The experience in other jurisdictions with final offer interest arbi-
tration may provide guidance as to how this arbitration process will
operate in Illinois. Despite the similarity of the structure of the final
offer arbitration procedures in Illinois and other jurisdictions, it must
be noted that factors such as the number of mandated impasse resolu-
tion steps, the type of employees who have access to the process, and
the demographic and political attributes of the governmental unit at
issue, will affect the validity of any attempted comparison.
1. The Size of Arbitration Awards
Will arbitration awards be larger than negotiated settlements?
The experience in other jurisdictions has been mixed. In Wisconsin,
for example, statistics indicate that there has been little difference in
economic outcomes between negotiations which do not use the "med-
arb" process and those which do.58 Similarly, in New York, where the
police and fire contracts called for binding interest arbitration, arbitra-
tion awards for police and fire were less than settlements achieved by
other unions in bargaining.5 9
58. Clune and Hyde, Final Offer Interest Arbitration in Wisconsin. Legislative History, Par-
ticipant Attitudes, Future Trends, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 455, 483 (1981) (statistics cover 1977 to 1981).
59. Newman, supra note 41, at 8 (statistics from 1981).
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An early in-depth economic analysis of final offer arbitration
based on experience with public safety employees in several states
found that, initially, final offer arbitration results in relatively higher
wage gains than would otherwise be won in the normal course of col-
lective bargaining, but that the relative gains under arbitration tended
to level off after the first few years.60 Yet statistics from the first few
years of experience under the Massachusetts mandatory final offer arbi-
tration law for police and fire indicate that awards favored unions two-
to-one and that such awards were costlier than settlements achieved
elsewhere in the public sector.6'
2. Reliance on the Arbitration Process
Will the institution of mandatory interest arbitration for certain
employees result in a reliance by the parties on the process? If parties
voluntarily agree to resort to interest arbitration, will this result in per-
manent reliance on the process? The structure of the arbitration proce-
dure creates certain incentives and disincentives for its use. The
experience of other states may suggest whether parties in Illinois will
come to rely on the process, presumably because of these incentives
and disincentives.
Generally, public sector employers have less incentive to resolve
interest disputes through arbitration than unions. Employers are usu-
ally in a defensive position in bargaining because it is typically the
union that is demanding improvements. Consequently, the employer's
attitude is that if the union really desires changes it will have to seek
them in interest arbitration. On the other hand, public employers are
less likely to want to give up their control of governmental operations
to an arbitration panel. However, if hotly contested political issues are
in dispute, the public employer may wish to leave the decision to the
arbitration panel. The arbitration process may thus insulate the public
employer from recriminations from its constituents.62 A public em-
ployer may also resort to arbitration in those instances where it is de-
manding that the union give up certain contractual rights or benefits.
60. J. STERN, C. REHMUS, J. LOEWENBERG, H. KASPER & B. DENNIS, FINAL-OFFER ARBI-
TRATION, (1975).
61. Note, Final Offer, supra note 16, at 112. Note. On November 4, 1980, the passage of
Ballot Question 2 in Massachusetts resulted in the repeal of compulsory interest arbitration for
police and fire. 889 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 12 (1980). A subsequent interpretation of this
Ballot Question by the State's Attorney General held that the State's Joint Labor-Management
Committee, established by statute, continued to have the authority to arbitrate police and fire
interest disputes. Committee awards, however, would not have any binding effect on state and
local legislative bodies. 907 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 19 (1981).
62. See, e.g., Note, Final Offer, supra note 16, at 115-16.
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The union is unlikely to agree to such changes in negotiations; there-
fore, the employer's only chance of gaining such concessions is in arbi-
tration. Finally, public employers inexperienced in collective
bargaining negotiations and unable to resolve employer-union negotia-
tion disputes may initially find security in the process because they may
be incapable of producing a settlement where there are wide differences
in bargaining positions.
Conversely, the incentives for unions to seek resolution of interest
disputes by an arbitrator are overwhelming. The likely result, there-
fore, is that unions will not try as hard to avoid bargaining impasses
when arbitration is available. Also, interest arbitration clearly provides
bargaining leverage to unions which are incapable of striking effec-
tively.63 Moreover, when the economic climate mandates wage freezes
and union concessions, resort to arbitration insulates union leaders
from criticism by their membership. 64 Unions typically have little to
lose in the process; they can ask for anything they wish, yet can fare no
worse than the employer's last offer on each issue, and they may do
better on any one or more issues if the panel selects the union's final
position. Finally, our experience suggests that once a party has re-
sorted to arbitration, a precedent may be set and the party thereafter
may be less inclined to resolve interest disputes outside of arbitration.
The experience of other states is mixed. In Iowa, where the statu-
tory impasse process calls for mediation, fact-finding and issue-by-issue
final offer arbitration, statistics on the first six years under the process
indicate that arbitration awards were limited to 4.5 to 7.1 percent of all
contracts negotiated. 65 In Michigan, where the impasse procedure for
police and fire is identical to that in the Illinois Act, available data
indicates that from 10 to 15 percent of all public safety negotiations
resulted in arbitration awards. Statistics between 1973 and 1977 in
Michigan indicate that there were an average of 100 requests for arbi-
tration per year, and about 30 formal awards issued each year. The
demographic breakdown of these statistics indicate that the state's larg-
est cities were more likely to resort to arbitration. 66 In New Jersey,
which utilizes a "med-arb" procedure, observers have found that the
63. Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 678, 679-
80 (1976).
64. The authors' experiences in interest arbitration are confirmed in Murray, Interest Arbitra-
tion in New Jersey. An Advocate's Reaction, 37 ARB. J. 13 (Dec. 1982).
65. Gallagher, The Use of Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 33 LAB. L.J. 501, 502
(1982) (citing Iowa Public Employment Relations Board, Impasse Statistics: Iowa's Collective
Bargaining Law, Fall 1981 (mimeograph)).
66. Id (citing Final-Offer Arbitration, supra note 16); Benjamin, Final-Offer Arbitration
Awardsin Michigan, 1973-1977(1978) (mimeograph); Michigan Department of Labor, Labor Reg-
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process has caused excessive reliance on neutrals. The statistics
demonstrate that the number of petitions for interest arbitration each
year has been constant while the number of awards issued has declined
each year.67 This trend is accounted for by the fact that "med-arb" is
viewed by some parties as "mediation with a club," 68 i e., if the parties
do not agree to the mediator's recommendations, the mediator, when
he or she assumes the arbitrator's role, is likely to require the adoption
of such recommendations. The first four years of experience in Massa-
chusetts showed the number of impasses had increased, and analysts
there conclude that final offer arbitration has failed to promote settle-
ment at earlier steps of negotiation. 69
D. Conclusion
The drafters' intent underlying this impasse resolution process was
to provide an alternative to strikes in those situations where the public
interest rejected strikes as a way to resolve impasse, yet still encourage
voluntary settlement and discourage the resort to arbitration.
Practically, the most powerful incentives for "voluntary" settle-
ment appear to lie with the statutory provisions which call for "med-
arb," as opposed to the final offer method of resolving impasses over
economic issues. "Voluntary" settlement in this context, however, as
suggested above, is somewhat of a misnomer. In reality, the parties will
tend to follow the neutral chairman's mediatory recommendations, for
such recommendations eventually will take the form of mandates once
an arbitration award is rendered. An exception may occur where the
chairman, as mediator, gives the parties broad guidelines as to accepta-
ble final offers and then remands the dispute to the parties for further
bargaining. If the parties at this juncture resolve their differences, the
settlement is of the parties' own making and is, therefore, more truly
voluntary. What this suggests, however, is that the parties still have
little incentive to settle in the pre-arbitration impasse steps. Thus, the
second objective of the impasse resolution process may not be achieva-
ble under this new structure in Illinois.
ister, Vol. 3 (April 1979) and Vol. 4 (Sept. 1980).) 820 GOVT EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 20-22
(1979).
67. Tennen, Interest Arbitration in New Jersey, 37 AEa. J. 9, 11-12 (Dec. 1982); Weitzman &
Stochaj, supra note 19.
68. Weitzaman and Stochaj, supra note 19, at 29.
69. Note, Final Offer, supra note 16, at I 10-11.
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II. PREPARATION FOR INTEREST ARBITRATION
A. The Statutory Criteria
The Act prescribes the criteria on which the arbitration panel must
base its award. Although slight variations exist, such factors are com-
mon to all final offer arbitration statutes.70  Illinois enumerates a
number of factors: (1) lawful authority of the employer; (2) stipulations
of the parties; (3) public welfare and financial ability of the governmen-
tal unit; (4) comparisons of wages, hours and conditions of employment
of the employees involved in the arbitration with those of employees
performing similar services and with other employees generally in both
public and private employment in comparable communities; (5) cost of
living; (6) overall compensation, including fringe benefits, presently re-
ceived by the employees; (7) changes in circumstances during the arbi-
tration proceedings; and (8) such other factors normally and
traditionally considered in determining wages, hours and conditions of
employment.7' These factors have not been listed by the legislature in
order of importance, nor does the Act state what weight is to be ac-
corded these factors. Thus, importance and weight are left for argu-
ment and may be critical to the award by the arbitrator.72
B. The Application of Statutory Criteria
1. Comparability
Recently published surveys of how arbitrators apply such statutory
criteria, and a review of published interest arbitration awards, provide
a clearer picture of the relative importance arbitrators attribute to such
statutory criteria. The fourth listed factor, commonly know as "compa-
rability," clearly is the most important factor to arbitrators. One survey
of arbitrators indicates that seventy-five percent of the arbitrators inter-
viewed placed the most reliance on this factor.73 Arbitrators suggest
that there are economic, ethical and practical reasons for this heavy
reliance on comparability. The economic justification for such reliance
is based on a market theory, i.e., a public employer must look to sur-
70. The new Illinois Act borrows these factors verbatim from the Wisconsin (WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 111.77 (1978)) and the Michigan (Police and Firefighters Arbitration Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.231 et seq. (1978)) interest arbitration statutes.
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(h)(I)-(8), supra note 6.
72. For example, if the employer pleads inability to pay, and successfully argues that this is a
threshold issue and that no other criteria can be considered unless and until the arbitrator finds
that the employer does have the ability to pay, the dispute may be resolved on this sole factor. See
infra note 86.
73. Weitzman and Stochaj, supra note 19, at 31.
TERMINAL IMPASSE PROCEDURE
rounding comparable communities in establishing terms and condi-
tions of employment to assure it can attract the necessary complement
of employees. 74 One arbitrator states that there is an "ethical or semi-
ethical" basis for relying on wage comparisons-"it is a claim for wage
parity for work requiring the same or similar skills, duties, and respon-
sibilities and offering relatively the same advantages and disadvan-
tages."'75 Finally, the pioneering and oft-cited study of Ervin Bernstein
on interest arbitration suggests that comparisons are the predominant
criteria because all parties at interest derive benefit from them. Specifi-
cally, Bernstein stated that:
To the worker they permit a decision on the adequacy of his income.
He feels no discrimination if he stays abreast of other workers in his
industry, his locality, his neighborhood. They are vital to the union
because they provide guidance to its officials upon what must be in-
sisted upon and a yardstick for measuring their bargaining skill. In
the presence of internal factionalism or rival unionism, the power of
comparisons is enhanced. The employer is drawn to them because
they assure him that competitors will not gain a wage-cost advantage
and that he will be able to recruit in the local labor market. Small
firms (and unions) profit administratively by accepting a ready-made
solution; they avoid the expenditure of time and money needed for
working one out themselves. Arbitrators benefit no less from com-
parisons. They have "the appeal of precedent and... awards based
thereon are apt to satisfy the normal expectations of the parties and
to appear just to the public."'76
The Illinois Act provides that comparisons with both private and
public sector employees are permissible. Obviously, there are pitfalls
to comparing wages, hours and conditions of employment in the public
sector with those in the private sector. Private sector comparisons ap-
74. See City of Galfeld, 70 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 850, 852 (1978) (Silver, Arb.) (N.J. police):
Comparisons of the economic facts in other localities bearing on the same type of em-
ployee are relevant because Garfield police do not exist in an economic vacuum. Both
they and their management look to salary levels in other communities particularly those
close by. This is so because what other localities are paying and other police officers are
receiving for the same or similar work bear directly on the ability of each geographically
proximate community to recruit and hold the kind of police officer who will perform his
responsibilities to the public in an effective and career like manner. Comparisons of
salaries and working conditions take into account that which the economists place under
the heading of labor market-immediate and secondary. It is the rise and fall of the
price of the terms of employment of the same labor working at similar tasks in the mar-
ket place as seen by competing buyers and sellers that underpins the concept of
comparability.
75. Arizona Public Service Co., 63 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 1189, 1195-96 (1974) (Platt, Chairman);
see also County of Monroe, 58 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 55, 57 (1974) (Roumell, Arb.) (The county admit-
ted that by only recommending a limited increase in wages it was asking these county employees
to subsidize county government work for less than their counterparts in comparable counties; the
fact-finder would not permit this.).
76. E. BERNSTEIN, ARBITRATION OF WAGES, Institute of Industrial Relations, Berkley, Uni-
versity of California Press (1954).
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pear valid only in those instances where the private and public sector
work is of a similar character. 77 Private sector comparisons are less
valuable when rates vary greatly for a particular type of work, and such
comparisons are artificial when the work involved is unique to public
employment. 78 Additionally, practitioners, commentators and arbitra-
tors alike agree that the most valid public sector comparisons are those
that have resulted from negotiated settlements and not from interest
arbitration.79 The rationale is that "if arbitration is to function success-
fully as a dispute-setting process, it must not yield substantially differ-
ent results than could be obtained by the parties through bargaining. ' 80
The heavy reliance placed upon the comparability factor has been
criticized by both unions and employers. Labor organizations com-
plain that use of this standard has a conservative effect by encouraging
the rejection of new and innovative language.8' This criticism has
some validity because we find that arbitrators tend to prefer to leave
innovation to negotiation between the parties and are concerned that
an innovative award might serve as precedent for other arbitrators' de-
cisions. 82 Employer critics of the comparability criterion suggest that it
has led to a "domino effect" of victories for unions. Although arbitra-
tors tend to avoid innovative awards, labor organizations, upon occa-
sion, have been successful in pushing through new provisions which in
turn are adopted by other arbitrators.8 3
Despite criticism of the heavy reliance on comparability, with suf-
ficient research all parties are usually able to establish statistics
favorable to their position. For comparability data involving compari-
sons of employees in the private and public sector performing similar
services, a party should look to such employees in the same geographic
area and in jurisdictions of similar size. The following list suggests that
77. For example, an analysis of private sector rates for craft employees, which have been
reached through collective bargaining, to determine public sector craft rates could be valid in
some cases. See Grodin, supra note 63, at 685.
78. Id See also, Weitzman and Stochaj, supra note 19, at 32 (a survey of arbitrators who
chaired police and fire hearings indicated that 94% paid little attention to private sector compari-
sons); and City of Beaumont, Texas, 65 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 1048, 1051 (1975) (Bailey, Chairman).
79. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 63, at 685.
80. Arizona Public Service Co., supra note 74, at 1196.
81. Clune and Hyde, supra note 58, at 474. See also Note, Final Offer Arbitration: The Last
Word in Public Sector Labor Disputes, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 525, 538 (1974); Long &
Fueille, Final Offer Arbitration: Sudden Death in Eugene, 27 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 186, 201
(1974); Nelson, supra note 17, at 57.
82. Nelson, supra note 17, at 57; Commonwealth EdisoA 72 LAB. ARa. (BNA) 90, 95 (1978)
(Goldberg, Arb.) (public utility interest arbitration) ("An arbitrator's response to a request for
innovation must be tempered by a considerable degree of respect for past practice and the reason-
able expectation of the parties in entering into arbitration.").
83. Clune and Hyde, supra note 58, at 474.
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type of comparative data which arbitrators have considered relevant in
arbitration: number of employees; wages (e.g., weighted average, mini-
mum and maximum, rate or grade); hours; and benefits (leave time,
paid holidays, insurance, pension, special allowances, etc.).84  Addi-
tionally, each party may develop descriptive statistics from the jurisdic-
tions with which it and/or the opposing party compares the jurisdiction
at issue. Obviously, the similarity in size of a jurisdiction being used
for comparison purposes becomes less relevant when other data sug-
gests that the jurisdiction has a dissimilar tax base, tax burden, current
and projected mandated expenditures, or legal authority to raise
revenue.85
2. Ability to Pay and Cost of Living
Generally, comparability data is used as the starting point; it sug-
gests the "going rate." Thereafter, arbitrators consider other factors to
determine whether anything militates against using the "going rate." 86
Typically, the public employer's "ability to pay," listed as the third fac-
tor in the Act as the "financial ability of the governmental unit,"87 and
the cost of living, the fifth factor in the Act,8 8 are the two factors most
often analyzed in light of the comparability data which the arbitrator
deems relevant. A demonstrated inability to pay is viewed as a limiting
factor to support an award less generous than otherwise indicated by
the comparability data.
The question arises as to how a public employer demonstrates an
inability to pay. Arbitrators have tended to place a heavy burden on
public employers because arbitrators believe that to do otherwise
would render ability to pay the controlling factor.8 9 Arbitrators also
seem to unrealistically believe that notwithstanding a plea of inability
to pay, priorities can be altered, taxes raised, etc., to pay a salary in-
crease to public employees.90 In fact, the third statutory criteria in-
84. The data which the authors have found necessary to an effective presentation is con-
firmed in Bowers, supra note 46, at 402.
85. Id.
86. But see, Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. Title 23, § 288.010 et seq. (1979) in which ability to
pay must be established first, then traditional standards used in interest disputes are applied.
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(h)(3).
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1614(h)(5).
89. Phillips, supra note 21, at 563. See, e.g., City of Southfiel4 78 LAB. AR". (BNA) 153, 155
(1982) (Roumell, Arb.) and arbitration awards cited therein.
90. Illustrative of this unrealistic approach of arbitrators concerning the ability to pay issue,
see Sioux County, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1258, 1267 (1977) (Gruenberg, Arb.); H. EDWARDS, R.
CLARK AND C. CARVER, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES AND MATERIALS 633
(2d ed. 1979) (citing 1971-72 decision in City of Detroit and Detroit Police Officers Association
interest arbitration).
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cludes both ability to pay and "the interests and welfare of the public."
Arbitrators interpret this clause to require a balance between the pub-
lic's concern over the increased tax burden related to any contemplated
compensation increase and the public's interest in quality services. 9 ' In
essence, this is the evaluation of a public employer's priorities which
arbitrators undertake in analyzing arguments of ability to pay.
The common approach taken by arbitrators on the ability to pay
issue is unrealistic, impractical, often fiscally irresponsible and politi-
cally untenable. A third party should not be able to single-handedly
alter the fiscal priorities of a political subdivision. In fact, it was this
trend which contributed to the City of Chicago's and other public em-
ployers' strong position that the Illinois Act had to provide for the right
of the legislative body to reject an interest arbitration award.
Cost of living, invariably a relevant factor, takes on added impor-
tance in times of sharply rising prices and inflation and in times of
economic recession. The rationale for including this as a statutory cri-
terion is "rooted in the ethical notion that workers' real wages should
not be allowed to diminish by reason of price movements beyond their
control since their needs do not diminish."92 And, conversely, employ-
ers who invariably suffer in recessionary periods should be able to raise
cost of living as an issue and demand similar consideration. Parties
inevitably manipulate figures and statistics to arrive at those most
favorable to their position. Therefore, in the area of cost of living, the
arbitrator's task is to determine over what period of time any increase
in cost of living should be measured. Typically, arbitrators look to the
change in the cost of living from the date of the employees' last pay
adjustment. 93
3. Other Statutory Criteria
Finally, general comments can be made about certain of the re-
maining statutory criteria which might elucidate how they can best be
used. The seventh factor is relevant changes in circumstances during
the arbitration proceeding. Changed circumstances could include con-
tract settlements within the governmental unit or the emergence of new
economic data.94 The first statutory factor relates to the legal authority
91. See, e.g., City ofBoston, 70 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 154, 157 (1977) (O'Brien, Chairman).
92. Arizona Public Service Co., supra note 74, at 1195.
93. Id See also City ofBoston, supra note 90 at 159. (Cost of living increase over 10 years
was 85% and during that period fire salaries increased 102.7%; yet, the cost of living increase over
2 years (date of last wage increase) was only 10.1%).
94. See, e.g., City ofBoston, supra note 90, at 160, wherein the City noted two such changes:
(1) the largest City bargaining units had settled contracts providing for no wage increases; and
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of the public employer. This factor is relevant to the employer's legal
ability to implement the arbitration award. Presumably, if the labor
organization's proposal necessitates an increase in local revenues, and
the public employer has no legal right to raise revenues unilaterally, the
arbitrator will have to consider how such an award can realistically be
implemented, or reject the proposal.
The final factor, a catch-all, would presumably include considera-
tion of bargaining history, both of past contracts and of bargaining
leading up to the arbitration. History of prior negotiations often assist
arbitrators in understanding what criteria the parties themselves relied
upon in reaching agreement. 95 The following illustration also suggests
the persuasive value of bargaining history: if the union demands a
clothing allowance and the employer can prove that this demand has
been successfully resisted in the past, the employer might argue that the
union cannot expect to achieve through arbitration that which it has
been consistently unable to obtain in collective bargaining. 96 But,
should a party in interest arbitration submit evidence of the bargaining
that led up to the arbitration? The down side to offering evidence of
one's own concessions during bargaining is that it may be used by the
arbitrator to justify further concessions. However, offering evidence of
one's own concessions can have a positive effect by establishing good
faith, and thus, it may discourage further compromise by the
arbitrator.97
C. Further Preparation Strategy
In addition to developing persuasive evidence as to why a party's
proposals are justified in accordance with the statutory criteria, certain
further strategies for presenting evidence are suggested by the structure
of the compulsory arbitration process. First, because economic and
non-economic issues are decided on an issue-by-issue basis, parties
(2) two fact-finding reports had issued which were more sympathetic to the City's inability to pay
arguments.
95. Holly and Hall, Dispelling the Myths of Wage Arbitration, 28 LAB. L.J. 344, 351 (1977).
96. Bowers, supra note 46, at 402.
97. Id., citing the following as an example of how bargaining history can be used to one's
advantage:
The union demanded an increase of four paid holidays at the beginning of negotiations.
Labor representatives expressed a willingness to accept two paid holidays at the end of
negotiations and in arbitration. However, management refused to increase paid holidays
throughout negotiations and has maintained that stance in the arbitration proceeding.
Other things being equal, presentation of this type of evidence by the union in arbitra-
tion may provide a rationale for the arbitrator to accede to the union in the award.
In fact, the opposite result is true. If the employer has justified its position, a failure to compro-
mise will not typically be penalized.
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must not only prepare arguments to support their own positions, but
they must also be prepared to refute each item the other side proposes,
even if they do not have a corresponding proposal, for failure to do so
can result in loss by default. Second, because the issue-by-issue process
typically results in package splitting, it is crucial that parties provide
the chairman with a clear understanding of those issues which they
must win and those issues that they can afford to lose. Third, there is
little risk in including controversial items with this type of decision-
making as there is with total package final offer arbitration. Perhaps
the only risk to forwarding numerous or controversial issues is that this
will affect the party's credibility before the neutral arbitrator. Finally,
because of the interdependent nature of many proposals, the parties
must continually make the chairman aware of the shape of the overall
package that is evolving out of the panel's decisions on each issue.98
CONCLUSION
Interest arbitration, while having only limited impact under the
new Illinois statute, will probably find favor, at least initially, with pub-
lic employers and unions who voluntarily choose this vehicle to resolve
their negotiation impasses rather than suffer strikes. Although the Illi-
nois Act's issue-by-issue/conventional interest arbitration bifurcated
approach was intended to encourage the parties to enter into voluntary
settlement, there is some doubt that it will significantly accomplish this
goal. Once the process starts, however, mediation by the neutral chair-
man selected by the parties in arbitration more likely will result in im-
passe settlements. The most controversial and significant provision of
the new procedure, legislative approval of interest arbitration awards,
will be audited carefully to see how it will affect the viability of the new
impasse resolution procedure. This will determine whether or not par-
ties voluntarily also will add this aspect to any agreement to arbitrate
interest disputes.
As Illinois public labor relations matures in the years to come, we
will see less of interest arbitration as an impasse resolution procedure
and correspondingly a greater number of settlements between the par-
ties; as employers and unions get more comfortable in their adversarial
relationship, experience shows that expensive and time consuming ar-
bitration, other litigation and strikes will become less necessary as a
means to resolve labor-management impasses.
98. See Bowers, supra note 46, at 404.
